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"REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS" AS A FACTOR IN
DEFINING PROPERTY INTEREST
ROBERTM. WASHBURN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" as a
factor in takings analyses first saw judicial daylight in 1978 in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,1 as part of a discussion to
determine at what point a land use regulation goes "too far" and
constitutes a taking.' Since that opinion, courts have varied in their
interpretation of the reasonable investment-backed expectations doctrine,
resulting in a lack of clear direction as to its meaning and importance?
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). A.B., Rutgers University,
1966; J.D., Washington University, 1968; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania, 1971. I am
grateful for the assistance of Rebecca K. Brandt, Rutgers Law School (Camden), class of
1993, Jennifer M. Perez, Rutgers Law School (Camden), class of 1995, and Jennifer L.
Hand, Rutgers Law School (Camden), class of 1997.
1. 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978). See generally Daniel R.
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995)
(reviewing the use of the reasonable investment-backed expectations standard in takings
law) [hereinafter Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations].
2. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
3. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 2.05, 2.18 (3d ed. 1993)
(discussing the harm benefit theory and the two part test used by courts to find a
Washington University Open Scholarship
64 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
Legal commentators have also differed greatly on the meaning and
usefulness of this doctrine.4
This Article examines the function of reasonable investment-backed
expectations as a factor in modem takings jurisprudence. Part II of the
Article explores the origins of the doctrine. Part III examines how the
phrase has been defined and interpreted since the Penn Central decision.
This part separately discusses the two components of the doctrine
("reasonable" and "investment-backed"). Part IV examines recent
holdings applying this doctrine, emphasizing the most recent takings
decision to come from the Supreme Court, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.5 The Article concludes with a discussion of the future
of this factor in takings jurisprudence.
regulatory taking) [hereinafter MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW]; Michael M. Berger, Happy
Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use
Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 765-70 (1988) (discussing the uncertainty in the area of
reasonable investment-backed expectations due to the Supreme Court's lack of guidance
to lower courts); Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 1, at 225
(discussing the confusion among the courts over the term "investment-backed expecta-
tions"); Lynn Ackerman, Comment, Searching for a Standard for Regulatory Takings
Based on Investment-Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Decisions in the
Vested Rights and Zoning Estoppel Areas, 36 EMoRY L.J. 1219 (1987) (discussing the
reluctance of federal courts to set a clear legal standard for regulatory takings).
4. Compare Berger, supra note 3 (discussing the conflict in what constitutes a
reasonable investment-backed taking); William C. Leigh & Bruce W. Burton, Predatory
Governmental Zoning Practices and the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause
Formulation: Timing, Value and R.LB.E., 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (discussing the
direction of new takings clause jurisprudence); Ackerman, supra note 3; William I.
Gulliford, III, Note, The Effect ofNotice of Land Use Regulations Upon Investment-Backed
Expectations and Takings Challenges, 23 STETSON L. REV. 201 (1993) (discussing a
systematic approach to regulatory takings); with MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note
3, §§ 2.05, 2.18; Bruce W. Burton, Post-Lucas Regulatory Takings and the Supreme
Court's Riddle of the R.LB.E.: Where No Mind Has Gone Before, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 155
(1994) (discussing the inconsistencies in Supreme Court decisions regarding reasonable
investment-backed expectations); Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings: Beyond the
Balancing Test, 20 URB. LAW. 389 (1988) (discussing when governmental regulations are
so burdensome that they overstep constitutional bounds); Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations, supra note 1; Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is
There a Taking?, 31 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 3 (1987) (discussing the meaning
of the investment-backed expectations factor and its application) [hereinafter Mandelker,
Is There a Taking?].
5. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF "REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS" AS A FACTOR IN TAKINGS ANALYSES
The phrase, "distinct investment-backed expectations," was
originally penned in Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s opinion in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.6 In that opinion, Justice
Brennan attempted to clarify the multi-factor balancing test used by
courts facing regulatory taking claims.7 In Penn Central, the owner of
Grand Central Terminal challenged as an unconstitutional taking New
York City's designation of the terminal as an historic landmark and the
city's rejection of the owner's proposal to construct a high-rise building
in the airspace over the terminal Justice Brennan's opinion for the
majority reviewed Supreme Court takings doctrine and noted that the
Court had never adopted a "set formula" for conducting Takings Clause
analysis.9 "[Brennan] adopted a multi-factor balancing test by identify-
ing several factors the Court had considered when it made... 'ad hoc,
factual inquiries.""0 The Penn Central standard, which numerous state
and federal cases have applied, reads:
[T]he Court's decisions have identified several factors that
have particular significance. The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmen-
tal action."
The concept of distinct investment-backed expectations brings the
economic impact of a regulation into the takings analysis by asking
whether the regulation interferes impermissibly with expectations on
which the owner has invested resources. 2 Justice Brennan did not
define "distinct investment-backed expectations" in Penn Central, but he
6. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7. Id. at 124.
8. Id. at 115-22.
9. Id. at 123-24.
10. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.13.
11. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
12. See MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.13 (noting that the takings
factors include the economic impact of the regulation).
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noted that the plaintiff had not established a taking "simply by showing
that [it had] been denied the ability to exploit a property interest" it
previously believed it could develop, namely the "air rights" over Grand
Central Terminal.
3
Justice Brennan went on to illustrate that the distinct investment-
backed expectations factor was actually first identified in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.4  In Pennsylvania Coal,15 the Supreme Court
held that because the statutory restrictions placed on the claimant mining
company "had nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of
rights claimant had reserved from the owners of the surface land," the
statute constituted a taking without just compensation. 6 The Pennsyl-
vania Coal opinion considered the costs to the property owner affected
by a government regulation, as well as the character of the government's
regulation. 7 Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
that although some diminution in property value must be tolerated, when
"'it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.""' 8
The Pennsylvania Coal opinion does not explicitly use the phrase
"distinct investment-backed expectations." However, as Justice Brennan
pointed out in Penn Central, it captures the spirit of the factor: it
requires the government to compensate an owner of property when
governmental regulation has an extreme impact on property value.' 9 In
this way, Pennsylvania Coal "set the terms for modem takings analy-
sis.""2
The phrase "reasonable investment-backed expectations" appears to
have its origin in a 1967 article by Professor Frank Michelman2' which
discusses the multiplicity of rules developed by the courts under takings
13. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130).
14. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
15. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
16. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 414-15 (1922)).
17. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 396.
18. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413).
19. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
20. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 396.
21. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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jurisprudence.22 Justice Brennan adapted the phrase from Michelman's
text:
[T]he test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree;
it does not ask "how much," but rather (like the physical-
occupation test) it asks "whether or not": whether or not
the measure in question can easily be seen to have
practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly
perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expec-
tation.23
Justice Brennan chose not to define the requisite expectations as
narrowly as Professor Michelman, but he did retain two components: the
first, "distinct," can be interpreted as well-defined or explicit; the second,
"investment-backed," involves a financial venture with a view toward a
specific future use. In later cases, "reasonable" replaced "distinct" in the
phrase.24 This change may reflect a shift to an objective standard or,
as Professor Daniel Mandelker suggests, "a balancing test that weighs
public benefits against private costs."
25
"Although this taking factor implies more, not less, protection for
landowners, the Court has so far applied it to uphold rather than strike
down land use regulations."' Courts have rarely relied on reasonable
investment-backed expectations as the sole factor in concluding that a
taking without just compensation has occurred. This is because it is only
one of several factors used in the takings analysis. It is nonetheless an
important facet of the current multi-factor balancing test the Court uses
when deciding a takings question.
22. For an in-depth and theoretical analysis of the relationship between Professor
Michelman's article and Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central, see Mandelker, Is
There a Taking?, supra note 4, at 10-13.
23. Michelman, supra note 21, at 1233 (emphasis added).
24. Eg., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). It is worth noting
that some courts still use the term "distinct" investment-backed expectations. For example,
see Szymkowicz v. District of Columbia, 814 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D.D.C. 1993). Some
courts use both "distinct" and "reasonable" interchangeably, Lyons v. Raymond Rosen &
Co., No. CIV.A.93-1514, 1994 WL 129955, at *12, *14 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 1994), while
still others follow Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir.
1985), aff'd sub nom. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987), and use the term "distinct, reasonable, investment-backed expectations," e.g.,
Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
25. Mandelker, Is There a Taking?, supra note 4, at 14.
26. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.18.
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Although reasonable investment-backed expectations constitutes only
one of the factors recognized by the majority of the Court in Penn
Central, it is an important one, given the emphasis it is at times given by
the Supreme Court.27 The reasonable investment-backed expectations
factor compels judicial consideration of "the bundle of rights that
constitutes property to determine the investment required to establish an
investment-backed expectation."'28 As illustrated in Penn Central,
where a regulation destroys only "one strand" in the bundle, courts have
not found a taking under this factor.29
This limitation, which affects the regulation of the entire property,
is further illustrated by Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v.
DeBenedictis.30 Keystone stands for the proposition that where the
governmental regulation adversely affects a reasonable investment-backed
expectation as to only one strand in the bundle of property rights, no
taking will be found; where the regulation adversely affects a number of
strands in the bundle, a taking may indeed be found.3' This bundle of
rights analysis balances all rights against the rights regulated. This
approach is analytically different from other Takings Clause approaches,
such as the balancing of a regulation's private harm versus its public
benefit.32
27. See Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles
Part I - A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1324
(1989) (discussing the role of reasonable expectations in the Supreme Court's takings
analysis).
28. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.18.
29. Id.
30. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
31. See MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.18.
32. See Thomas A. Hippler, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory
Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use, " "Average Reciprocity ofAdvantage,"
and "Bundle ofRights"from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 653, 695-97 (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court analyses of regulatory takings
in Penn Central).
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III. How THE COURTS HAVE DEFINED "REASONABLE
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS"
A. "Reasonable"
1. The General View of "Reasonable"
The word "reasonable" in "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions" would seem to be the easiest word in the phrase for courts to
consider and for litigants to predict outcomes, for it is a common and
familiar criterion in legal reasoning.33 As one commentator noted:
When the Court discusses this factor, it usually is consid-
ering whether the claimant reasonably relied to her
economic detriment on an expectation that the govern-
ment would not act as it did - that is, that it would not
deprive her of the property at issue. Sometimes, however,
the Court focuses not on the claimant's reliance, but
rather on whether the challenged law permits the claimant
to make some reasonable use of her tangible resource. In
still a third class of cases, the Court equates "reasonable
expectations" with "property." Furthermore, the Court
sometimes treats the second Penn Central factor as
decisive, and at other times it does not. 4
Although the concept of "reasonable" in the phrase may seem simple at
first glance, it is essential to determine in what context to consider it.
A landowner's expectations are shaped by certain givens. In the
land use context, the most important are the law of property and
nuisance"- and the land use rules (statutes and ordinances) in existence
at the time the owner purchased or otherwise invested in the land.36 A
33. See Berger, supra note 3, at 765 (noting that the term "reasonable" is the easiest
part of the phrase for courts to use).
34. Peterson, supra note 27, at 1320 (emphasis added).
35. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-2902 (1992)
(reviewing takings jurisprudence); John M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law,
Lucas, and the Growth Management Act, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1259 (1993)
(examining Washington state takings regulations after the Supreme Court's decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council); Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, The
Individual and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 MD. L. REV. 162
(1993) (discussing regulatory takings law and the nuisance exception in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council).
36. Leigh & Burton, supra note 4, at 843-44.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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landowner should not be heard to complain that land use or environmen-
tal regulations existing at the time of purchase constitute a taking on the
basis of interference with investment-backed expectations. 37  The
landowner's expectations are shaped by the practicable and probable uses
available under the law of property and nuisance, as well as existing
rules and regulations.38 A legislature should not be able to interfere
with those expectations in a retroactive manner, without stripping the
Takings Clause of its meaning.
39
In his article, Michael Berger identifies twelve factors which have
been utilized by courts in determining whether a property owner's
expectations are reasonable under this component of the takings
analysis:"
37. The property owner can complain on other grounds: physical interference, denial
of economically viable use, or failure to substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, §§ 2.03-2.05.
38. See Leigh & Burton, supra note 4, at 868 (citing United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605
F.2d 762, 818 (5th Cir. 1979) ("If ... a proffered potential use is not reasonably
practicable or probable.., then of course the landowner is not entitled to have evidence
concerning that use considered by the trier of fact."); Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations, supra note 1, at 227-31 (discussing different approaches to defining
expectations in property under the Taking Clause); Gulliford, supra note 4, at 218-19
(considering what is meant by reasonable expectations).
While vested rights may be a clear way for property owners to obtain enforceable
expectations, see Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 1, at 237-38, a
rule that equates the two doctrines is too narrow and would result in insufficient protection
of property interests.
39. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
40. Similarly, in Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995), the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case so that the fact-
finder could answer certain questions in order to apply the Penn Central multi-factor
inquiry, including, the extent to which the regulation interfered with investment-backed
expectations:
In this case, those questions are: (1) the history of the property-when was it
purchased? How much land was purchased? Where was the land located?
What was the nature of title? What was the composition of the land and how
was it initially used?; (2) the history of development-what was built on the
property and by whom? How was it subdivided and to whom was it sold?
What plats were filed? What roads were dedicated?; (3) the history of zoning
and regulation-how and when was the land classified? How was use
proscribed? What changes in classifications occurred?; (4) how did develop-
ment change when title passed?; (5) what is the present nature and extent of the
property?; (6) what were the reasonable expectations of the landowner under
state common law?; (7) what were the reasonable expectations of the neighbor-
[Vol. 49:63
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(1) the severity and extensiveness of regulations at the
time the property was purchased; (2) the past regulatory
history of the specific property; (3) the degree of impair-
ment of the uses of the property; (4) the uses available
before enactment of the challenged regulation; (5) the
novelty or expectedness of the governmental action; (6)
whether specifically (and traditionally) recognizable
"sticks" were removed from the owner's bundle of
property rights; (7) whether any rights (like the transfer-
able development rights in Penn Central) were substituted
for those impaired; (8) whether existing uses were
permitted to continue; (9) whether government representa-
tions were formal or informal; (10) the ability to sell the
property to others at a fair price; (11) the general power
of government to regulate; and (12? the harshness of the
local regulatory and legal climate.4
The Supreme Court's adoption of the investment-backed expectation
factor added a new element to takings jurisprudence, emphasizing the
rights of property owners and suggesting that courts apply this new factor
to strengthen the position of the property owner against governmental
regulation. The doctrine, however, has not developed in such a clear
analytical line.42 As illustrated in the following cases, what seemed like
reasonable investment-backed expectations to the property owner (i.e.,
the ability to develop one's land) were usually found to be unreasonable
by the courts when considered in light of the elements identified by
Michael Berger.
2. A More Discrete View of the Factors
In practice, courts have relied upon some factors more often than
others and have given the factors different weights in their analyses. For
instance, the first factor, which concerns the severity and extensiveness
of regulations at the time the property was purchased, was especially
ing landowners under state common law?; and (8) perhaps most importantly,
what was the diminution in the investment-backed expectations of the
landowner, if any, after passage of regulation?
Id.
41. Berger, supra note 3, at 765-67 (footnotes omitted).
42. See MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.18 (discussing the
development and application of the investment-backed expectation factor).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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important to the court in Deltona Corp. v. United States.43 In Deltona
Corp., the plaintiff developer claimed that it suffered an uncompensated
taking as a result of federal regulations that affected one of its planned
subdivisions. 4 Deltona had purchased a 10,000 acre tract of land in
1964 which it planned to develop as a waterside community.45 Deltona
subdivided this tract into five areas which it planned to develop
sequentially. The developer obtained dredge and fill permits in both
1964 and 1969 for its first and second subdivisions, but the Army Corps
of Engineers denied the developer's request for a permit to develop the
entire third subdivision in 1976.46 The circumstance of the denial
involved a change in federal jurisdiction encompassing Deltona's land.47
The Court of Claims, noting that the regulations were very complex,
41
wrote that "Deltona is no longer able to capitalize upon a reasonable
investment-backed expectation which it had every justification to rely
upon until the law began to change."49 The court noted that Deltona
previously succeeded in obtaining permits in 1964 and 1969, and
recognized that it was not able to develop a portion of the third
subdivision "[a]s the result of an unforeseen change in the law."0 In
its final analysis, however, the court denied Deltona's takings claim
because the frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations
"neither 'extinguish[es] a fundamental attribute of ownership,' nor
prevents Deltona from deriving many other economically viable uses
from its parcel-however delineated."'"
The third factor identified by Berger, the degree of impairment the
regulation places upon the property, proved significant in Southview
Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartzi2 In Southview Associates, a developer
43. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. C1. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
44. Id. at 1185.
45. Id. at 1188.
46. Id. at 1188-89.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1187.
49. Id. at 1191.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1192 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (citation
omitted)).
52. 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Southview Assocs. Ltd. v.
Individual Members of Vermont Envtl. Bd., 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993).
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sued members of the Vermont Environmental Board claiming that the
Board's denial of a permit to develop a residential subdivision because
the proposed development would severely impair a deeryard, constituted
a taking of property without just compensation.53 Application of the
reasonable investment-backed expectations factor led the court to
conclude that Southview's expectations were not reasonable, rather, they
were optimal. The Board's decision left intact the claimant's ability to
(1) construct improvements for farming, logging, or forestry; (2)
construct residential or commercial improvements "involving" less than
ten acres of the property; (3) construct and sell up to nine homes; and (4)
make recreational use of the land.54 The Southview Associates opinion
illustrates how much economic loss may be sustained by an owner
without compensation from the government, based on an analysis that
balances all rights against the rights regulated.55
A clear application of the "reasonable" standard appears in Lakeview
Development Corp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe.56 In this case, the
plaintiff developer claimed it had a vested right to complete its develop-
ment without further restrictions from the regional planning agency.57
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated unequivocally that Lakeview
had not been denied all economically viable use of its land and thus its
reasonable investment-backed expectations had not been upset.58 In
support of this conclusion, the court noted that of the two hundred
dwelling units originally proposed by the developer, only twenty-eight
would not be permitted. 9
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel,6° the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros
53. Id. at 87, 90-91.
54. Id. at 94.
55. See Hippler, supra note 32, at 695-96 (describing this consideration in Penn
Central). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (holding that
an ordinance establishing a mining depth limitation is not so onerous as to result in a
taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that an ordinance that
prohibited the manufacturing of bricks on plaintiff's property was not a taking).
56. 915 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991).
57, Id. at 1291.
58. Id. at 1300.
59. Id.
60. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
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Act,61 and refused to find a taking without just compensation. In
"[c]onsidering the economic impact on the Association's property as a
whole," the court held that "the Act [did] not interfere with the
Association's 'distinct investment-back[ed] expectations' of using its
property for grazing cattle. Nor [did] it impair the Association's right to
hold the property for investment purposes. 62
Finally, in Jentgen v. United States,63 the Claims Court concluded
that even though the claimant landowner was able to develop only fifty
percent of his property as a consequence of a federal regulation that
affected his ability to develop a planned residential community, this fact
"merely present[ed] an instance of some diminution in value."' The
Supreme Court has long held that mere diminution in value, standing
alone, cannot establish a taking.65
The fourth factor identified by Michael Berger, the examination of
the uses available before the enactment of the challenged regulation,66
is also commonly discussed by courts. A few non-land use cases can
illustrate this factor. In Price v. City of Junction,67 the constitutionality
of a city's "junk car" ordinance was at issue. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that "[b]y their very nature such inoperable junk vehicles
do not embody reasonable, investment-backed expectations."68  The
lesson here is that courts will not include something of little or no value
when applying this factor.
Similarly, in In re Gifford,69 the appellant debtors sought to avoid
a non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in personal
61. Id. at 1425, 1430 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982)).
62. Mountain States Legal Foundation, 799 F.2d at 1431 (quoting MacLeod v. Santa
Clara County, 749 F.2d 541, 547 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984)).
63. 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
64. Id. at 1214.
65. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (noting
that courts "uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing
alone, can establish a 'taking"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (holding that one of the factors in deciding whether a taking has occurred is the
degree in which the values incident to the property are diminished by the regulation in
question).
66. Berger, supra note 3, at 766.
67. 711 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 591.
69. 688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982).
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property, to which the creditor objected on the grounds that it would
constitute a taking. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
the "property" interest affected involved a "less than substantial"
investment-backed expectation, as the value of the collateral was
"insignificant" to begin with. 0
It is interesting to note that the dissent in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., ' concluded that the statute at issue there did
not interfere with the appellant's reasonable investment-backed
expectations because she could not have expected to produce income
from the use of her one-eighth cubic foot of roof space occupied by the
cable television installation.7 The majority opinion found a taking not
through interference with investment-backed expectations, but on the
basis of a physical appropriation. 3
Michael Berger's sixth factor, whether specifically (and traditional-
ly) recognizable "sticks" were removed from the owner's bundle of
property rights,74 has also played an important role in takings jurispru-
dence. The Supreme Court has indicated that a reasonable investment-
backed expectation may protect divisible property rights from regula-
tion.75  However, this protection is limited because courts do not
safeguard all divisible property rights. 6 A court will deny Takings
Clause protection where only a single strand in the bundle is affected so
long as there are enough other strands to make up for the loss, reasoning
that the owner's primary investment-backed expectations have not been
frustrated.77
Hodel v. Irving78 involved a section of the Indian Land Consolida-
tion Act7 9 that required small fractional property interests to escheat to
the respective Indian tribe. Individual members of the tribe brought suit,
70. Id. at 456, 458.
71. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
72. Id. at 453 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 438.
74. Berger, supra note 3, at 766.
75. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
76. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.18.
77. Id.
78. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
79. Id. at 706 (citing Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-459, tit.
II, 96 Stat. 2519 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1994))).
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claiming that the statute resulted in an unconstitutional taking of their
property without just compensation." The Supreme Court found that
the statute did, indeed, "'go[] too far.''8 The Court characterized the
right to devise valuable property to one's heirs as a valuable right, which
was not outweighed by the weak "average reciprocity of advantage"
argument advanced by the government.8 2
The strongest opinion on the "stick removal" issue is Kaiser Aetna
v. United States. 3 In this case, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether a private waterway could be termed a navigable water of the
United States, thus qualifying it as a public right-of-way. 4 The Court
held that the "'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right, [fell] within [the] category of interests that
the Government cannot take without compensation." 85
3. The Notice Issue
Michael Berger's ninth factor, government notice,86 receives much
attention in reasonable investment-backed expectations analysis. This
factor inquires into "whether the claimant parted with [a property right]
of economic value in reliance on an expectation that the government
would not act in a particular manner.' 87 The foreseeability of the
government's action negates a takings claim under this element of the
test, with the proviso that if the government promises a property owner
one thing, but does another, a taking may indeed occur.88  Several
cases, including two United States Supreme Court cases, have squarely
addressed this consideration.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,8 9 a corporation attempting to
register a pesticide brought suit to enjoin the operation of the data-
disclosure provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
80. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710.
81. Id. at 718 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
82. Id. at 715.
83. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
84. Id. at 168.
85. Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted).
86. Berger, supra note 3, at 766-67.
87. Peterson, supra note 27, at 1321.
88. See id. (discussing takings cases where the government has broken a promise).
89. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), ° claiming that these provisions effectuated
a taking. Under the original 1947 FIFRA, all pesticides had to be
registered with the Secretary of Agriculture prior to sale.91 The 1947
version of FIFRA prohibited disclosure of any information regarding the
formulas of the pesticides,' but did not protect any information
concerning health and safety data.93  In 1972, Congress amended
FIFRA by passing the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act.9
4
Subsequent to its amendment, FIFRA protected only data the submitter
denoted as "trade secrets or commercial or financial information." 95 In
addition, the 1972 amendments permitted the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to use all of the registered data submitted by one
applicant for the purpose of evaluating other applicants seeking to
register similar chemicals. % The 1972 amendments also provided a
procedure governing public disclosure of the submitted data.97
Congress amended FIFRA again in 197898 in order to clarify the
definition of "trade secrets or commercial or financial information," and
to provide more guidance for the use of registered data in the evaluation
of a new product.99
Monsanto brought suit against the EPA alleging that the disclosure
of their secret data pursuant to FIFRA's provisions effectuated a taking
of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment."°  After finding that Monsanto had a protectable property
interest in its data in the form of a trade secret, the Supreme Court turned
90. Id. at 990 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994)).
91. Id. at 991 (citing FIFRA, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 61 Stat. 163, 166-67 (1947) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994))).
92. Id. (citing FIFRA §§ 3(c)(4), 8(c), 61 Stat 163, 166, 170 (1947) (current version
at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994))).
93. Id. at 991.
94. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 136 (1994))).
95. Id. at 992 (citing Federal Environmental Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516,
§ 10(a), 86 Stat. 973, 989 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(a) (1994))).
96. Id. (citing § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. at 979-80).
97. Id. at 992-93 (citing §§ 10(a)-(c), 86 Stat. at 989).
98. Id. at 994 (citing Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819
(current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994))).
99. Id. at 993-94 (citing § 15, 92 Stat. 819, 829-32; § 2(a), 92 Stat. 819, 820).
100. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998-99.
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to the takings question. The Court held that data disclosure was
foreseeable, with regard to data submitted before the 1972 amend-
ments.' O' Therefore, Monsanto's investment-backed expectations were
not reasonable. 02 With regard to data submitted between 1972 and
1978, however, the Court held that Monsanto's investment-backed
expectations were reasonable because FIFRA had explicitly "guaranteed
to Monsanto ... an extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive
use."'
103
This holding suggests that a finding of reasonable investment-backed
expectations may be enough to establish that the government has caused
a taking to occur. Also important to the Court's analysis of the pre-1972
data-disclosure provisions was the fact that by registering its product
under FIFRA, Monsanto received the ability to market its pesticides in
the United States.'" The Court emphasized this exchange of data for
certain economic advantages in its conclusion that no taking had
occurred.0 5
The Supreme Court's distinction between the pre-1972 data and the
1972-1978 data is a touchstone for further development of the reasonable
investment-backed expectations doctrine. The Court established that a
taking may occur under circumstances where the statutory scheme
provided protection for trade secrets because the property owner could
clearly rely on the existing statutory protection. The improper use of
trade secret data by EPA in this situation frustrated "Monsanto's
reasonable investment-backed expectation with respect to its control over
the use and dissemination of the data it had submitted."'"
In reaching its decision, the Court opined that to be reasonable, the
expectation must be more than a "unilateral expectation or an abstract
need."'0 7 The reasonableness of Monsanto's expectations were defined
by the statutory law at the time it submitted the data to EPA.0 8
101. Id. at 1009.
102. Id. at 1009-10.
103. Id. at 1011.
104. Id. at 1007.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1011.
107. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
108. Id. at 1006.
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Therefore, the protection granted in the 1972 amendments gave
Monsanto certain reasonable expectations, while the 1978 amendments
changed those expectations for data submitted after that date."°
Because the statute explicitly permitted the protection of trade secrets
from 1972 to 1978, Monsanto had a right to rely on the statute then in
effect." This explicit statutory guarantee of confidentiality supplied
a reasonable basis for Monsanto's expectations."' While EPA was
granted the authority under the 1978 amendments to prospectively
disclose trade secret data, it could not employ that authority retroactively
to disclose data submitted prior to the 1978 amendments."' Because
the 1972-1978 data was protected by different statutory language which
created confidentiality expectations in Monsanto, EPA's disclosure
triggered the obligation to pay just compensation.!1 3
The second Supreme Court opinion to consider Berger's ninth factor
is Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.'"4 The petitioner, an
employer, challenged the constitutionality of the Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA),"' which required an employer
withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan to pay a fixed share to
the plan amounting to the employer's proportionate share of the plan's
"unfunded vested benefits."" 6 The Supreme Court analyzed the statute
under the takings framework set forth in Penn Central.17  A
unanimous Court concluded that employers "had more than sufficient
notice" that pension plans were not only being regulated at the time
MPPAA was enacted, "but also that withdrawal itself might trigger
additional financial obligations.""' In support of this conclusion, the
Court noted that long before the adoption of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 and MPPAA, it was clear that if an
109. Id. at 1006-07. See Gulliford, supra note 4, at 219-20 (analyzing the reasonable
investment-backed expectations discussion in Monsanto).
110. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-14.
111. Id. at 1011.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1013-14.
114. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
115. Id. at 213, 220-21 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1982)).
116. Id. at 217 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1391).
117. Id. at 224-26.
118. Id. at 227.
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employer "exercised its discretion to pay benefits upon the termination
of a multiemployer pension plan, employers who had contributed to the
plan during the preceding five years were liable for their proportionate
share of the plan's contributions during that period."" 9
Part of the Court's rationale has special ramifications for land use
law. Justice White stated that "[t]hose who do business in the regulated
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end."'20  Accordingly, partici-
pants in any field of endeavor that is highly regulated, such as land use,
will be considered to be "on notice" that later amendments, which may
be economically detrimental to the landowner but serve the legislative
ends of the original statute, will likely be held constitutional under the
Connolly reasoning.' Foreseeability is the key; if an action was
foreseeable, there is no taking. Under this reasoning a taking will occur
only where the regulation was not foreseeable.'
In the land use context, Monsanto appears to create more enforce-
able property rights than does Connolly. The Court found Monsanto's
property rights in the explicit wording of FIFRA from the 1972
amendments through the 1978 amendments." Legislatures can always
amend statutes, and part of a property owner's expectations depend on
the statutory law in place when the owner acquires the property interest.
What the legislature cannot do, however, is interfere with existing
property rights which form the owner's expectancy interest." 4 In the
119. Id. at 226-27 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1364).
120. Id. at 227 (quoting F.H.A. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958), reh'g
denied, 358 U.S. 937 (1959)).
121. Katherine Stone and Philip Seymour noted that "[iln areas subject to extensive,
ongoing regulation," especially in land use, "there can seldom be a reasonable expectation
that current rights will remain inviolate against future regulation." Katherine E. Stone &
Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the Timing of Development: Takings Clause and
Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24 LOy. L.A. L. REV.
1205, 1223 (1991). See also Gulliford, supra note 4, at 218-19, 230-31 (noting that
investment-backed expectations must be at least consistent with the law in force at the time
the property was acquired).
122. Peterson, supra note 27, at 1320-22.
123. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11.
124. See generally, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904
(1992) ("[T]he means as well as the ends of regulation must accord with the owner's
reasonable expectations. Here, the State did not act until after the property had been zoned
for individual lot development and most other parcels had been improved, throwing the
whole burden of the regulation on the remaining lots.').
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land use context, a property owner purchases property based on existing
rules and regulations created by applicable statutes and ordinances.
There is no limitation on the government's ability to alter these
regulations, provided the change advances a legitimate state interest and
avoids one of the categorical or per se classifications for finding a
taking.125  However, if the law is changed, thus altering the existing
rules upon which a property owner has already reasonably relied, the
owner's property rights should be protected.
26
Subsequent cases have extended the "reasonably foreseeable"
rationale of Connolly to deny relief to property owners. One such
opinion is Parkridge Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home
Administration.27  Parkridge Investors involved a petitioner who
owned an apartment complex financed by the Farmers Home Administra-
tion (FmHA) under the Rural Rental Housing Program. 28 In order to
obtain financing through this program, owners of rural apartment
complexes were required to provide affordable low-income housing.'
29
In 1985 Parkridge Investors Limited Partnership, purchased an FmHA
complex in Deadwood, South Dakota, assuming the rights and obliga-
tions of the previous owner. 30  The financing agreement assumed by
Parkridge allowed for prepayment of the mortgage at any time. 3' In
1987, however, Congress adopted the Emergency Low Income Housing
Preservation Act of 1987.132 The Act placed strict conditions and
limitations on mortgage prepayment, such as a waiting period and a sale
125. Id. at 2897 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987) ("[L]and-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests' .... )).
126. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (finding a
taking where the state passed legislation regulating the plaintiff's property); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (finding a taking where plaintiff relied on provision of
FIFRA); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)
(finding a taking where county took interest payments of an interpleader fund). But see
Leigh & Burton, supra note 4, at 843-44 (indicating that a reasonable actor might
anticipate changes in statutes or regulation).
127. 13 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2163 (1994).
128. Id. at 1195 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1485 (1988) and § 515 of the 1949 Housing Act).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1472(c) (1988)).
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requirement, in order to preserve low-income housing facilities.' a
When Parkridge was precluded from exercising its contractual prepay-
ment option in 1990, it brought suit seeking to declare the Preservation
Act unconstitutional as applied and an unconstitutional taking of
property. 34 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, taking into account
the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, concluded that
such action was foreseeable.'35 The court based its decision upon the
policy underlying the loan program and the Act, which was to prevent
the decline of senior citizen and low-income housing through prepay-
ment. 36  Because this type of action was foreseeable, Parkridge's
investment-backed expectations were not reasonable and therefore, the
takings claim failed.
In a further case, Ciampitti v. United States,"7 a group of land-
owners who bought various tracts of land in the beach town of
Wildwood, New Jersey, sued, claiming a taking when the Army Corps
of Engineers denied their permits to fill wetlands. 38  Ciampitti pur-
chased seven tracts of land in an area known as Diamond Beach. In all
but the last of these purchases, he purposely avoided buying land within
the wetland-designated areas.'39 The United States Claims Court noted
that Ciampitti had been put on notice that he might not be able to obtain
the necessary permits by both his engineering firm and federal govern-
ment officials before he purchased the last tract of land. 40 Despite
Ciampitti's argument that the land had a riparian grant which he thought
would allow him to fill, and that other similar properties were allowed
to be filled, the Claims Court denied his takings claim.' 4' The opinion
relied heavily on the fact that Ciampitti had notice and therefore his
distinct investment-backed expectations were not reasonable. 42
133. Parkridge Investors, 13 F.3d at 1195-96.
134. Id. at 1197.
135. Id. at 1199.
136. Id.
137. 22 CI. Ct. 310 (1991).
138. Id. at 311.
139. Id. at 312-13.
140. Id. at 321.
141. Id. at 314-15.
142. Id. at 321.
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4. The Opinion in Bowles v. United States
A recent opinion from the United States Court of Federal Claims
breathes new vitality into the "reasonableness" requirement. In Bowles
v. United States, 43 the Army Corps of Engineers refused to grant the
petitioner a permit to fill his land in a subdivision known as Treasure
Island in Brazoria County, Texas. 144 The Corps of Engineers required
the permit to fill for the installation of a septic tank for a single-family
home. 145 Mr. Bowles argued that he never knew that a fill permit was
required, and that a single-family home was the only possible use for the
small lot.'4 Denying the permit, Bowles contended, basically robbed
him of all economically viable use of his property. 47  The Claims
Court found a taking, holding that denial of the fill permit rendered the
property worthless.
48
In dicta, the court discussed Bowles' investment-backed expecta-
tions, focusing heavily on the question of notice to determine if his
expectations were objectively reasonable. 149 The evidence established
that owners of other lots in the subdivision never had to obtain fill
permits from the Army Corps. Therefore a reasonable person would have
no notice of the need to apply for a fill permit. 5 Furthermore, the
court noted that Bowles had experience working with local regulatory
agencies, was aware of the permit requirements and even discussed his
plans with agency officials before purchasing the property. Even with
this experience, Bowles was still not aware of the jurisdiction of the
Army Corps. This fact, the court reasoned, supported its finding that
Bowles did not have notice of the permit requirement. Therefore, the
court held that Bowles' investment-backed expectations were reason-
able.' 5'
The implication of this decision is that if Mr. Bowles had had notice
of the Corps' jurisdiction, his expectations would have included the full
143. 31 Fed. CI. 37 (CI. Ct. 1994).
144. Id. at 40.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Bowles, 31 Fed. CI. at 46, 47-49.
149. Id. at 50-51.
150. Id. at 51.
151. Id.
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extent of Corps ability to regulate in areas under its jurisdiction. While
Bowles' knowledge of Corps' jurisdiction still would not excuse a total
deprivation of use or value resulting from the denial of a fill permit, the
extent of his expectations would be affected by his awareness of Corps'
regulatory jurisdiction.'52
Several facts weighed heavily in Bowles' favor in the court's
discussion of the reasonableness of his expectations. Significantly, the
court noted the fact that Bowles merely wanted to build a retirement
residence on his lot, like other property owners in the subdivision had
done.' Moreover, Bowles could have met all other legal and regula-
tory requirements to build his home, which strongly indicated that his
expectations were reasonable. The court also found his plans to be
"financially and physically feasible."' 54
5. General Power of the Government
Finally, Berger's eleventh factor, which involves the general power
of the government to regulate, 15  was used by the Third Circuit to deny
plaintiffs' takings claims. In Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury
Township,'56 the town planning commission denied the plaintiff's
application for a permit to develop its land for industrial use pursuant to
an amendment to the local zoning ordinances.'57 Pace purchased a 146
acre tract of land which it divided into 47 lots. Pace planned to sell
these lots for the development of an industrial park, and obtained a
permit in 1973 for industrial use for the first six lots, which it later
sold.'58 In 1976, the town adopted a new zoning ordinance which
152. Id. See Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 1, at 225
(observing the Lucas court's holding that a landowner should "expect" newly enacted
regulations to restrict the use of her property is counter intuitive).
153. Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) ("The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by
similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition.");
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987) ("[T]he right to build
on one's own property... cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.");
Groen & Stephens, supra note 35 (discussing the difference between federal and state law
protection of property rights).
154. Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 50.
155. Berger, supra note 3, at 767.
156. 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, reh 'g denied, 483 U.S. 1040
(1987).
157. Id. at 1025.
158. Id.
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zoned all of Pace's land for industrial use. 59 Pace submitted a second
permit request for an industrial park in 1978. At the same time,
however, the Township, after receiving complaints by citizens, began
reconsidering the 1976 zoning ordinance.' 6° In 1979, the Township
denied Pace's permit, based on defects in Pace's plan under the 1976
ordinance, and subsequently denied a modified plan submitted by
Pace. 6' In the same month, the Township rezoned thirty-seven acres
of Pace's land for agricultural rather than industrial use. 62 Pace
brought an action to invalidate the rezoning, and eventually
prevailed.6 3  In a further proceeding, Pace claimed that the illegal
rezoning constituted a taking, and sought to recover damages for losses
it sustained between the time the Township denied the permit and the
time Pace prevailed in its challenge to the rezoning. 1"4 In rejecting
Pace's takings claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
[b]ecause Pace's expectations, in order to be reasonable,
were necessarily subject to the power of the state to
reasonably regulate in the public interest, Pace could have
had no reasonable expectation in the Spring of 1979 that
it would be entitled to utilize its 37 acres in accordance
with its original plan.
65
In other words, Pace was operating within a regulatory scheme in which
its permits could either be granted or denied. Within this framework, it
had no reasonable investment-backed expectation that each permit it
requested would definitely be issued once the Township changed its
zoning ordinance. This point is further illustrated:
Given this regulatory framework, Pace could have had a
reasonable expectation of recouping its $142,000 invest-
ment in accordance with its original plan only through its
1978 submission. That submission, however, was consid-
ered by the Board of Supervisors under the original
ordinance and was unaffected by the 1979 rezoning.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Pace Resources, 808 F.2d at 1025.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1025-26.
165. Id. at 1033.
Washington University Open Scholarship
86 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
Once the Township modified its zoning ordinance in
1979, Pace became subject to the amendments with
respect to any plans Pace submitted after the date of
enactment ....
A subsequent Third Circuit opinion, Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City
of Philadelphia,67 also views the power to regulate as an a fortiori bar
to reasonable expectations. In Midnight Sessions, the City of Philadel-
phia denied licenses to two businesses that sought to operate as dance
halls. The city based its denial primarily on neighborhood disapproval
and safety concerns generated by the potential for large crowds.'68
Although the district court held that the plaintiffs had been denied their
reasonable investment-backed expectations, the court of appeals
reversed. 6 9 The court of appeals noted that the district court looked
mainly to the investment-backed expectation factor rather than consider-
ing this factor in conjunction with the decrease in property value. 7
More importantly, the circuit court followed Pace and held that "[w]hile
appellees' expectations of dance hall licenses and profits are investment-
backed, they cannot be reasonable in light of the City's explicit power
to regulate dance halls."' 7' The Third Circuit requires that for an
investment-backed expectation in a regulatory framework to be reason-
able, landowners must take into account the possibility that the govern-
ment may change its ordinance or regulation, or simply deny a li-
cense.172
These cases illustrate that there cannot be a set formula for
determining when an owner's expectations are reasonable. Each case
must be decided on its own facts. There is one principle that does
commonly apply, however, and that is the extent to which the govern-
ment can change the rules in mid-stream. It is clear that a property
166. Id.
167. 945 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992).
168. Id. at 671.
169. Id. at 673, 687.
170. Id. at 678.
171. Id.
172. If this reasoning were true, why should not value be enhanced by reasonably
foreseeable or available ordinance changes or permits? See Leigh & Burton, supra note
4, at 863 (arguing that reasonably foreseeable zoning changes that would benefit the
property value should be part of the reasonable investment-backed expectations analysis).
[Vol. 49:63
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/6
1996] "REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS" 87
owner does not have a vested right in the rules remaining un-
changed. 73  Even Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Lucas,
recognized the state's right to enact value-affecting regulations. 7 On
the other hand, a property owner's rights are not simply what the
government says they are. 175 Between these extremes, property owners
have a right to rely on the existing rules, provided that their reliance is
reasonable and backed by some investment."' Courts are still strug-
gling with the delicate balance between a property owner's right to rely
on the existing rules and the scope and extent of the government's
authority to change those rules. 177
173. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, at § 2.18 ("[A] property owner does
not have investment-backed expectations ... when he is on notice of a regulation that may
affect the value of his property.") (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984)). But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-900
(1992) (stating that although there is an implied limitation on a person's use of land, if the
state eliminates all viable use of the property, a taking has occurred). The Lucas rationale
appears to fix the date for reasonable investment-backed expectations on the date of
acquisition or the date the investment is made. This seems to be too narrow a definition,
rendering government virtually powerless. See Leigh & Burton, supra note 4, at 847, 852-
53 (arguing that the more appropriate method of calculating investment-backed
expectations is to look to the legal status of the property just before the government began
its regulatory activities).
174. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 ("'[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power."') (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The Takings Clause, while conferring substantial protection on property
owners, does not eliminate the police power of the State to enact limitations on the use of
their property.'); Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 1, at 225
(arguing that the Lucas court's recognition of an implied police power limitation is
inconsistent with the Court's holding that a taking occurs when the economic viable use
is denied).
175. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (holding that confiscatory regulations cannot deprive
the land of economic vitality unless such restrictions inhere in the title itself); Leigh &
Burton, supra note 4, at 839-40, 848, 855 & n.156 (arguing that predatory local land use
regulation is at the core of takings). See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 834 n.2 (1987) ("mhe right to build on one's own property... cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit."'); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d
893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) ("In determining the severity
of economic impact, the owner's opportunity to recoup its investment or better, subject to
the regulation, cannot be ignored.').
176. Leigh & Burton, supra note 4, at 843-44 & nn.86, 88.
177. For an example of an extreme resolution of this problem, based on a literal
projection of the Lucas rationale, see Leigh & Burton, supra note 4, at 856. It is clear that
the government's ability to change the rules depends on the property owner's notice of the
rules when he purchased the property. E.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 49
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B. "Investment-Backed"
1. Reasonable Return vs. Speculation
The second component of the reasonable investment-backed
expectations analysis, whether the expectations are "investment-
backed," 78 has spawned much commentary from both courts and legal
critics. The problem seems to have originated within the Penn Central
opinion itself. Justice Brennan carefully distinguished mere profitability
or the most optimal use of property from seeking to obtain a "reasonable
return" on the investment. 79  This has been characterized as the
"speculator exception," referring to a speculator interested in the
profitability of land as opposed to others who will theoretically be
satisfied with a reasonable return on their property investment. 8
Consequently, since the Penn Central decision, courts have been
confused and conflicted over the proper interpretation of this distinction.
Professor Mandelker notes the limitations placed on the expectations
taking factor by Justice Brennan. Professor Mandelker attributes the
Courts' refusal to protect speculation to the "social undesirability" of
land speculation. 8' One definition distinguishes land investment from
land speculation by characterizing the former as holding land to earn a
profit on activities conducted on the land during the holding period, and
the latter as holding land to earn a profit on its capital appreciation when
it is sold.' This approach limits application of the investment-backed
expectations factor by circumscribing the type of expectations a court
will consider investment-backed.' The Supreme Court has held that
the mere purchase of land does not make an expectation investment-
backed; the only expectation the law recognizes is the expectation that
(1994). But see Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 1, at 225
(asserting that property owners expect that new regulations will restrict the use of their
property from time to time).
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
179. Id. at 136.
180. Michelman, supra note 21, at 1223 ("A decision not to compensate is not unfair
as long as the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such decisions
might fit into a consistent practice. . ").
181. Mandelker, Is There a Taking?, supra note 4, at 19.
182. Id. at 21 (citing L HEALY & J. SHORT, THE MARKET FOR RURAL LAND 65
(1982)).
183. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, § 2.18.
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regulation will not restrict the use of land so much so that no reasonable
use remains." Recall that a taking does not occur so long as a
landowner's primary expectations in the use of his land are not
frustrated.'85 Limiting expectations to those which attempt to earn a
profit on activities conducted on the land seems to fit squarely within this
notion of reasonableness.
Professor Mandelker, however, notes that there are serious
difficulties with this approach to determining whether a purchaser bought
the land for investment or speculation. Not only is an analysis of motive
required, but a court must also consider whether the motive has changed
over time. 8 6  By contrast, whether an investment is reasonable is
considered only in reference to the time at which the investment was
made.' s7 Conceivably, one who purchases land speculatively but who
later decides to profit from the use of the land, could be denied
compensation for a taking because his motive changed from that of a
speculator to that of a developer. 8 8 At the same time, an owner whose
investment is found to be reasonable when made before the enactment
of a governmental regulation will be compensated for a taking, while the
same investment made after the governmental regulation would be
deemed unreasonable. In many cases, courts have focused on the
"reasonable" factor in their application of this test,'89 only applying the
speculator exception to the "investment-backed" factor when it is clear
that the landowner is attempting to exploit the land to receive a capital
gain.'"
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Mandelker, Is There a Taking?, supra note 4, at 21.
187. Peterson, supra note 27, at 1322.
188. See Mandelker, Is There A Taking?, supra note 4, at 21.
189. In a number of cases, courts appear to decide the issue solely upon examination
of the reasonableness of the expectations involved. E.g., Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984).
190. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495-96
(1987); Southview Assocs. Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84,94 (1992); Lakeview Dev. Corp.
v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1300 (1990); Jentgen v. United States, 657
F.2d 1210, 1213 (1981).
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2. Character of the Investment
Two Supreme Court opinions addressing the takings issue have
focused on the character of the investment rather than the amount of
return received by the property owner. 9 ' In PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 92 the California Supreme Court held that a Califor-
nia state constitutional provision allowing individuals to exercise their
free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned
shopping center did not violate the owner's Fifth Amendment rights. 93
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the United States Supreme Court employed
the reasonable investment-backed expectations test to affirm that no
taking occurred. The Court noted that PruneYard failed to show that the
"right to exclude others" was so essential to the economic value of the
property that a taking had occurred.'94 The Court was careful to
distinguish the factual context from that in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States,95 emphasizing that in Kaiser Aetna the investment in the
property contemplated exclusive and private use, while in PruneYard, the
investment contemplated public use of the property.' 96 However, this
distinction is unique to these two cases, each of which virtually ignores
the profitability/reasonable return dilemma.
3. Investment as Vested Rights
A decisive factor in establishing whether a property owner's
expectations are investment-backed is the extent to which the owner has
fulfilled his development plans. 97 The law of vested rights prohibits
the government from changing the rules along a spectrum of activity
ranging from the developer's application for a building permit, up to the
191. Matthew P. Pritts, Note, The Material Burden Test: The Better Method of
Determining Takings Issues Arising Under Section 621 (a)(2) of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1109, 1137-38 (1991).
192. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
193. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
194. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
195. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
196. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
197. See generally John . Delaney & Emily . Vaias, Recognizing Vested Develop-
ment Rights as Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Taking Claims,
49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 27 (1996); Ackerman, supra note 3.
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actual or substantial start of construction.'98 Once a property owner
obtains vested rights under the relevant rules in effect in a given
jurisdiction, the owner's expectations should be held sufficiently
investment-backed to deserve judicial protection.'99 However, while
obtaining vested rights under state law should be a clear case for finding
that expectations are investment-backed, with the permit or construction
serving as objective evidence, it should not be the only basis. To hold
that the investment-backed test is met only when a property owner has
substantially relied on a development permit ignores the original
investment in the property and the myriad of financial and other forms
of investment that can occur between the purchase of the property and
the attainment of a building permit.2"'
Clearly, in order for expectations to be investment-backed, some
form of distinct, well-defined, monetary investment must be present.0 2
However, the courts have given little guidance on the type or extent of
such investment.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the "investment-backed"
component of the test squarely, but may in the near future, as "[1]ower
courts []have rendered conflicting decisions on whether to accept the
notion of profitability as a test for determining whether a taking has
occurred."2 °3
198. E.g., Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1994).
See generally MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 3, §§ 6.12-6.23; John J. Delaney,
Protecting Development Rights, 10 PRAc. REAL. EST. LAw. 53 (1994); John J. Delaney,
Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to "Let's Make a Deal!", 25 URB.
LAw. 49, 51-52 (1993); Delaney & Vaias, supra note 197; Ackerman, supra note 3, at
1235-56.
199. See Delaney & Vaias, supra note 197; Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations, supra note 1, at 236-38; Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1235; Gulliford, supra
note 4, at 216-17.
200. See Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 1, at 236-38.
201. See, e.g., Gulliford, supra note 4, at 217-18.
202. Id.
203. Berger, supra note 3, at 768. See also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding a taking based on the fact that Florida Rock
was prevented from doing profitable business); Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of New
York, 746 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. 40 Eastco v. City of New York,
470 U.S. 1087 (1985) (denying a taking where Park Avenue alleged loss of profit);
William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that the fact that a regulation creates a substantial economic loss for an individual does not
convert the regulation into a taking), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928, reh'g denied, 446 U.S.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE "REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS" FACTOR IN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In June 1992, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2" Lucas is significant, if for
no other reason, because the Court found that the regulation in question
amounted to a taking as applied to the landowner. Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, did not use the "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions" factor in his analysis. Instead, he fashioned a categorical standard
of whether the regulation in question denied the landowner "all
economically beneficial or productive use" of the property." 5 This
analysis actually echoes the two pronged test applied in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis2" as opposed to the multi-
factor balancing test of Penn Central.2 7 Keystone confirmed a test the
Court had established earlier in Agins v. City of Tiburon,"' namely that
a taking occurs if the regulation "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land."209 Because the Court in Lucas found that the claimant's two
beachfront lots had been rendered valueless, rather than merely
diminished in value, by the regulation banning coastal zone construction,
the Court did not need to reach the three pronged analysis articulated in
Penn Central.210
Expectations analysis did appear in Justice Scalia's formulation of
the categorical test. In discussing the nuisance exception, the Court
indicated that the state law of property and nuisance help shape a
929 (1980).
204. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
205. Id. at 2893.
206. 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987).
207. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
208. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
209. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
210. These three factors are: (I) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; (2) its interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the governmental action. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
[Vol. 49:63
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/6
1996] "REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS" 93
landowner's expectations:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think
it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with. This accords, we think, with our "takings"
jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of,
and the State's power over, the "bundle of rights" that
they acquire when they obtain title to property. 1
Justice Scalia hinted that expectations can be measured at the time of the
owner's acquisition of the property."'
Justice Scalia also responded to Justice Stevens' dissent by making
clear that the Court's analysis in Lucas did not obviate the need to
examine other factors, such as "[t]he economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and... the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations" in cases where the
landowner does not suffer a total loss. 213
Justice Kennedy's concurrence clearly supported consideration of
reasonable investment-backed expectations in regulatory takings analyses.
Justice Kennedy specifically stated that, "[w]here a taking is alleged from
regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test must be
whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed
expectations."2 4 In addition, the concurrence would allow the govern-
ment more leeway in affecting land values. Justice Kennedy stated that
211. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 (footnotes omitted).
212. Id. ("[O]ur 'takings' jurisprudence, ... has traditionally been guided by the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of... the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquire when they obtain title to property.").
213. Id. at 2895 n.8 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). See Leigh & Burton,
supra note 4, at 844-50 (discussing reasonable investment-backed expectations and Lucas).
See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (discussing the "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule).
214. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's categorical
formulation does not depend on inquiry into the interference with investment-backed
expectations. Justice Scalia reserved that inquiry for non-categorical cases. Id. at 2895
n.8. Although Justice Kennedy heavily emphasized the expectations test, he clearly
departed from the majority opinion by combining the two tests and by not recognizing the
categorical test that is the core of the majority opinion.
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"[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise
of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society,"2 5 and
that "reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole
of our legal tradition."2 6  In essence, in order to support a severe
restriction on property, "the means as well as the ends of regulation must
accord with the owner's reasonable expectations. 2t 7 Despite the fact
that the discussion in the majority opinion is dicta, and the obvious
differences on this point between Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy,
Lucas not only leaves the reasonable investment-backed expectations
factor in place, but re-emphasizes its role in takings analyses. The
repeated references to property owners' expectations in both the Scalia
and Kennedy opinions may be a signal that the Supreme Court intends
to give greater consideration to this factor in future opinions than it has
in the past.
B. Post-Lucas Holdings
A number of 1992 rulings, as well as a recent 1994 opinion, seem
to take their cue from Lucas' underscoring of the inquiry into reasonable
investment-backed expectations as part of their takings analysis. In
Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham,"8 an outdoor
advertising company sued the city seeking to invalidate, on constitutional
grounds, an ordinance prohibiting all commercial, off-premises advertis-
ing signs."' The district court's decision relied primarily on an inquiry
into the ordinance's interference with Naegele's investment-backed
expectations. The court concluded that the five and one-half year
amortization provision gave rise to the expectation that there would be
no use of the signs thereafter."0 The court did not reach its conclusion
on that factor alone, but also looked briefly into the character of the
government action."
215. Id. at 2903 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2904.
218. 803 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D.N.C. 1992), af'd, 19 F.3d 11 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 317 (1994).
219. Id. at 1070.
220. Id. at 1079.
221. Id. at 1079-80.
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Similarly, in Berrios v. City of Lancaster, 22 the district court
relied on the reasonable investment-backed expectations factor in its
determination that a sixty-day notice provision concerning condemned
property nullified any expectation that may have arisen by the payment
of monthly rent.2" The court admitted that a reasonable investment-
backed expectation to remain in possession of the property for thirty days
arises upon payment of a monthly rent. 4 Nonetheless, because the
ordinance at issue involved a sixty-day notice period, there simply was
no reasonable investment-backed expectation to retain possession beyond
those sixty days when the "investment" purchased was in thirty day
periods. 22
Finally, in Bowles v. United States,z 6 the Court of Federal Claims
focused heavily on whether Bowles had a reasonable investment-backed
expectation that he could place fill on his land. 7 In finding for the
plaintiff, the court ultimately held that he had been robbed of all
economically beneficial use.2 s The court, in dicta, indicated that even
if all economically beneficial use had not been taken, Bowles' reasonable
investment-backed expectations had "been substantially frustrated so that
compensation is required under the Fifth Amendment." 9
V. CONCLUSION
These cases embody the increasing significance that the reasonable
investment-backed expectations factor is receiving in takings jurispru-
dence. Initially, when Justice Brennan described this factor in Penn
Central,23' lower courts considered it a minor part of the takings
analysis. However, more recently, and especially after Lucas, courts
seem less hesitant to rest their decisions predominately on whether the
governmental act has wrongly interfered with the reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the landowner and, as illustrated above, to
222. 798 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
223. Id. at 1158.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1159.
226. 31 Fed. CI. 37 (1994).
227. Id. at 49-50. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 53.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
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dispose of cases on this factor alone. Recent court opinions are laying
a firm foundation for future judicial reliance on reasonable investment-
backed expectations as an important factor in determining whether
governmental regulation constitutes a taking of private property.
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